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The Complexity of Neural Responses to Visual Stimuli: On 
Carruthers’s Challenge to Block’s Overflow Argument 
Ned Block’s Overflow Argument purports to establish that the neural basis of 
phenomenal consciousness is independent of the neural basis of access 
consciousness. In a recent paper, Block’s argument has been challenged by Peter 
Carruthers. Carruthers concedes the truth of one of the argument’s key steps, 
namely, that phenomenal consciousness overflows what is in working memory. 
At the same time, he rejects the conclusion of the argument by developing an 
account of this overflow that is alternative to Block’s. In this paper, I argue that 
Carruthers’s account does not pose a real threat to the Overflow Argument. The 
overall plausibility of Carruthers’s account rests on the empirical plausibility of a 
claim concerning global broadcasting which, albeit intuitively plausible in light of 
a lightly-sketched picture of the impact of attention upon neural matters, he offers 
no sufficient empirical evidence for. Drawing on some important imaging studies 
that reveal striking facts about neural responses to visual stimuli, I argue for two 
intimately related claims: first, that the intuitive plausibility of claims like 
Carruthers’s is not a guarantee of empirical plausibility; second, that as concerns 
the same claims, strong empirical evidence is needed before confident judgments 
of empirical plausibility can reasonably be formulated. 
Keywords: overflow argument; phenomenal consciousness; access 
consciousness; global broadcasting; neural responses; attention 
1. Introduction 
Ned Block’s distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness 
(e.g., 1995, 2007a, 2007b) has had a huge impact in the philosophy of mind.1 A mental 
state is said by Block to be phenomenally conscious if there is something it is like for 
one to be in it. A mental state is said by Block to be access conscious, instead, if its 
 
1 This article has been accepted for publication in Philosophical Psychology, published by 
Taylor & Francis. 
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content is broadcast in the global workspace, and is thus accessible to a number of 
consuming mechanisms: e.g., “mechanisms of reporting, reasoning, evaluating, 
deciding, and remembering” (2007a, p. 491) (more on access consciousness and global 
broadcasting in §2). Block’s distinction has been the object of extensive debate. While it 
is widely agreed that phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness are different 
concepts (Carruthers, 2017), do they also pick out different properties? And if they do 
pick out different properties, do those properties always co-instantiate?  
Since the publication of his paper “On a Confusion about a Function of 
Consciousness” (1995), Block’s aim has been to establish that phenomenal 
consciousness and access consciousness empirically disassociate (Carruthers, 2017). 
The Overflow Argument (e.g., 2007a, 2007b) represents his major (as well as most 
debated) attempt to do so. The argument purports to establish that the “neural basis of 
phenomenology does not include the neural basis of cognitive access to it” (2007a, p. 
489) or, equally, that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness is independent of 
the neural basis of access consciousness. 
Block takes the results of George Sperling’s experiments (1960) to support the 
view that more information is phenomenally conscious than can be reported or, equally, 
that the contents of phenomenal consciousness overflow what can be reported. He then 
argues that this overflow is best explained by assuming that the neural basis of 
phenomenal consciousness is independent of the neural basis of access consciousness. 
The vast majority of Block’s critics (e.g., Cohen & Dennett, 2011; Phillips, 2011; 
Stazicker, 2011) have rejected the conclusion of the Overflow Argument by challenging 
the overflow claim. In a recent paper, Peter Carruthers (2017) has opted for a different 
approach. Unlike those critics, Carruthers concedes Block the truth of overflow. He also 
argues, however, that there is a “better” (2017, p. 65), “and empirically plausible 
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[emphasis added]” explanation of this overflow (2017, p. 67), one that supports the 
view the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness is not independent of the neural 
basis of access consciousness. 
The aim of this paper is to challenge Carruthers’s attempt to block the Overflow 
Argument. More precisely, it is to argue that the former does not pose a real threat to the 
latter. The overall plausibility of Carruthers’s account of overflow rests on the empirical 
plausibility of a claim concerning global broadcasting which, albeit intuitively plausible 
in light of a lightly-sketched picture of the impact of attention upon neural matters, he 
offers no sufficient empirical evidence for. Drawing on some important imaging studies 
that reveal striking facts about neural responses to visual stimuli (e.g., Kastner et al., 
1998; Scalf et al., 2011), I argue for two intimately related claims: first, that the intuitive 
plausibility of claims like Carruthers’s is not a guarantee of empirical plausibility; 
second, that as concerns the same claims, strong empirical evidence is needed before 
confident judgments of empirical plausibility can reasonably be formulated. The upshot, 
I suggest, is that Carruthers’s alternative account of overflow does not threaten the 
Overflow Argument.  
Here is the plan. In §2 I present Block’s Overflow Argument in detail, and in §3 
Carruthers’s challenge to it. Next, in §4, I draw on the results of the abovementioned 
imaging studies to bring to light the complexity of neural responses to visual stimuli – 
especially to multiple simultaneously presented stimuli.2 In §5, I then argue that the 
complexity of neural responses to visual stimuli has some important implications for 
attempts to assess the empirical plausibility of certain claims about global broadcasting. 
 
2 For brevity, in what follows, I shall often drop the “simultaneously presented” qualification 
and speak of multiple stimuli alone. 
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Last, in §6, I explain how those implications enable us to disarm Carruthers’s challenge 
to Block’s argument. The conclusion I draw is twofold: first, the question whether the 
neural basis of access consciousness is included in the neural basis of phenomenal 
consciousness remains far from settled. Second, and more broadly, any future attempt to 
determine the empirical plausibility of certain claims about global broadcasting will 
need to attend carefully to the delicate and subtle empirical evidence that bears heavily 
upon the issue.  
2. The Overflow Argument 
In this section, I present Block’s Overflow Argument, following (at least in part) 
Carruthers’s (2017) reconstruction of it. The argument proceeds in two main steps. 
Drawing on the work of Sperling (1960), the first step purports to establish that more 
information is phenomenally conscious than is in working memory. From there, the 
second step concludes that the “neural basis of phenomenology does not include the 
neural basis of cognitive access to it” (Block, 2007a, p. 489) or, equally, that the neural 
basis of phenomenal consciousness is independent of the neural basis of access 
consciousness. 
Clarifications are already in order – what is working memory? This can be 
defined as the active storage of information in an accessible form (Baddeley, 2007; 
Cowan, 2005). Working memory is an active form of memory in that its contents need 
to be actively sustained. Information retained in working memory is accessible in that it 
can be used in a number of complex cognitive tasks. To give some examples, we use 
working memory when doing mental arithmetic or when, in an experimental setting, we 
are asked to report the contents of a display after stimulus offset. It is widely accepted 
among cognitive scientists that the capacity of working memory is limited to about three 
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or four “items” (Cowan, 2001). To a first approximation, an item can be thought of as 
information about an integrated object; that is, for example, information about a shape 
that specifies its orientation, color, and identity (Luck & Vogel, 1997).  
Back to the Overflow Argument. In his whole report paradigm, Sperling 
presented participants with arrays of letters – 3x4 arrays, for example – for 50 
milliseconds. After stimulus offset, participants were then required to verbally list all 
the letters in the array. Although they believed that they had seen all or most of the 
letters quite clearly, they could only report about four on average. In a second 
experiment – the partial report paradigm – participants were presented with similar 
arrays of letters. This time, however, they were only required to give a partial report of 
the contents of the array. 150 milliseconds after stimulus offset, a randomly chosen row 
was cued by sounding a tone: a high tone for the upper row, a medium tone for the 
middle row, and a low tone for the lower row. According to the instructions provided 
prior to stimulus onset, participants had to report the letters from the cued row. Sperling 
found that, in each trial, participants were able to accurately report most of the letters 
from the cued row – typically three out of four letters. 
  
 
Figure 1. Typical array of letters used in the Sperling experiments. From Phillips (2011) 
Block thinks that the results of the partial report paradigm support the view that 
(P1) participants are phenomenally conscious of all or most of the presented items in 
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detail. Additionally, given that (P2) the capacity of working memory is limited to three 
or four items, he concludes that (C1) more information is phenomenally conscious than 
is in working memory. From there, Block argues that (C1) is best explained by 
assuming that (C2) the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness is independent of the 
neural basis of access consciousness. In order to fully appreciate the argument, I still 
need to explain a number of things. 
To begin with, Block – and indeed Carruthers – is committed to the Global 
Workspace Model of access consciousness (e.g., Baars, 1988; Dehaene et al., 2011; 
Dehaene & Naccache, 2001). According to the model, the architecture of the mind/brain 
comprises “two main computational spaces” (Dehaene et al., 2011, p. 56): a set of 
parallel processors whose job is to compute mental representations (e.g., perceptual and 
quasi-perceptual representations), and a global workspace. The latter is a system that 
enables processors to “communicate” or exchange information with one another. At any 
one time, a number of processors compete or cooperate to broadcast information in the 
global workspace for further processing. Following Block (2007a, p. 491), it will be 
useful here to distinguish between supplying and consuming processors. Supplying 
processors (e.g., processors that compute perceptual representations) broadcast 
information in the global workspace. Consuming processors (e.g., processors that 
compute mental representations for deliberation and report) instead, take that 
information as input and process it further. According to the Global Workspace Model, 
access consciousness is identical to global broadcasting. More precisely, the idea is that 
an access conscious representation is a representation whose content is globally 
broadcast, and hence accessible to the consuming processors connected to the 
workspace.  
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One more thing to note concerns Block’s view on the relationship between the 
global workspace and working memory. Block assumes that the former is identical to 
the latter (e.g., 2007b, p. 539, 2007a, p. 491). Along with what I said in the paragraph 
immediately above, this entails a number of things. First, to say that (P2) the capacity of 
working memory is limited to three or four items, is to say that (P2A) the capacity of the 
global workspace, and hence of access consciousness, is limited to three or four items. 
Second, the claim that (C1) more information is phenomenally conscious than is in 
working memory, is in effect identical to the claim that (C1A) more information is 
phenomenally conscious than is in the global workspace, and hence than is access 
conscious. Last, to say that (C2) the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness is 
independent of the neural basis of access consciousness, is equivalent to saying that 
(C2A) the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness is independent of the neural basis 
of global broadcasting, and hence of the neural basis of working memory. 
For the sake of clarity, it will be useful here to reconstruct the first step of the 
Overflow Argument – the step from (P1) to (C1) – as follows: 
(P1A) Information about all or most of the twelve characters is phenomenally 
conscious; 
(P2A) The capacity of the global workspace, and thus of access consciousness, is 
limited to three or four items; Thus, 
(C1A) More information is phenomenally conscious than is in the global 
workspace, and hence than is access conscious. 
What about the second step of the argument – the step from (C1) to (C2)? To 
appreciate this step, I still need to say a few words about some of the neural and 
functional events that are thought to be at play in visual perception. When a stimulus is 
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presented in one’s visual field, it causes neural activity in the occipito-temporal areas of 
the brain (e.g., Dehaene & Changeux, 2004; Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000). There is 
evidence that when one reports seeing the stimulus, attention to the stimulus boosts 
occipito-temporal activity, causing it to trigger activation in more frontal areas of the 
brain, such as the prefrontal cortices, anterior cingulate, and parietal areas (e.g., 
Dehaene et al., 2006; Lamme, 2004). When one does not report seeing the stimulus, 
instead, neural activity remains confined to the occipito-temporal areas. This activity, 
nonetheless, can be almost as strong as activity that because of the boost received by 
attention, triggers activation in more frontal regions (e.g., Dehaene et al., 2006; Lamme, 
2004). 
We are now in a position to return to the second step of the Overflow Argument, 
namely, the step from (C1) to (C2). According to the Global Workspace Model, the 
spreading of neural activity from the occipito-temporal areas to more frontal areas is the 
neural basis of global broadcasting. More precisely, it is the neural basis of the global 
broadcasting of the information that this activity carries, and hence of access 
consciousness.3 Block agrees that the spreading of neural activity to more frontal areas 
is the neural basis of global broadcasting, and hence of access consciousness. However, 
he also argues as follows. Let us assume that strong neural activity in the occipito-
temporal areas of the brain can be (and is) phenomenally conscious independently of its 
 
3 It is normally assumed by neuroscientists and philosophers alike that at least some kinds of 
neural activity carry information/have content. In the case of neural activity caused by the 
presentation of a stimulus, the former is thought to carry information about the stimulus. 
Although neuroscientists do not always intend “content” or “information” in the same way 
as philosophers – that is, in a semantical sense – in the present debate it is generally 
assumed that they do (Wu, 2018). 
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spreading to more frontal areas, and thus of access consciousness. We will then have a 
mechanism that explains how (C1) more information is phenomenally conscious than is 
in working memory. On this basis, Block concludes that (C1) is best explained by 
assuming (C2), namely, that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness is 
independent of the neural basis of access consciousness.4  
3. Carruthers’s Response to the Overflow Argument 
In this section I present Carruthers’s attempt to block the Overflow Argument. As 
anticipated, Carruthers grants Block the truth of overflow. That is, he grants that (C1) 
more information is phenomenally conscious than is in working memory. Unlike Block, 
however, he also thinks that this fact is not best explained by the claim that (C2) the 
neural basis of phenomenal consciousness is independent of the neural basis of access 
consciousness. In his view, there is a “better” (2017, p. 65) “and empirically plausible” 
(2017, p. 67) explanation of (C1), one that supports the view that the neural basis of 
phenomenal consciousness is not independent of the neural basis of access 
consciousness. To make his point, Carruthers puts forward five related theses, which he 
suggests are all widely accepted among cognitive scientists (2017, p. 68): 
 
4 One might wonder whether the truth of (C2) is a necessary condition for the truth of the claim 
that phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness disassociate. Could not 
phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness come apart but share the same neural 
basis? This is a very interesting question, one that I would tentatively answer in the 
negative. For if we understand the neural basis of a mental property P to be sufficient for 
the tokening of P, then how could phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness 
have the same neural basis and yet disassociate? The issue is certainly worthy of closer 
inspection, and I am thankful to an anonymous reviewer for bringing it to my attention.  
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(1) “[A]ttentional signals directed at representations in sensory regions of the brain 
are a necessary (and, with other factors, sufficient) condition for those 
representations to be globally broadcast”;  
(2) “attention is a limited resource: only so much information can be attended to at 
any one time”; 
(3) “the effect of attentional signals is to boost the neural activity underlying the 
targeted representations”; 
(4) “working memory uses the same attentional network to sustain previously-
presented sensory representations in the global workspace”; 
(5) “global broadcasting takes place when some sort of threshold of neural activity 
is reached”. 
Before expanding on Carruthers’s account of (C1), allow me to clarify what he means 
by “sensory regions” – this is important, both for present and later purposes. Carruthers 
takes the phrase to refer to mid-level, as opposed to low and high-level, visual areas. 
There is some debate as to which visual areas classify as mid-level and which as low-
level. Among the mid-level areas, however, Carruthers (2015) would certainly include 
areas V2, V3, V3A, V4, and V5 (see also Prinz, 2012). In his own words, these areas 
“receive input from V1 and process the motion, color, and form of a stimulus, but 
without yet conceptualizing or categorizing it” (2015, p. 14). It is precisely mid-level 
areas that are thought to process the contents that can enter the global workspace (e.g., 
Carruthers, 2015; Prinz, 2012). And it is also activity in the very same areas that Block 
thinks can be phenomenally conscious in the absence of global broadcasting. 
Two more things to clarify concern Carruthers’s understanding of access 
consciousness and his understanding of the relationship between working memory and 
the global workspace. Carruthers notes that Block (1995) characterizes access 
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consciousness dispositionally: a mental representation is access conscious “in the sense 
that [its content] is available (counter-factually) to systems for forming memories, for 
generating affective reactions, for planning, and for verbal report” (Carruthers, 2017, p. 
65). Carruthers also notes, however, that in his most recent writings (e.g., 2007a) Block 
has been leaning towards a categorical understanding of access consciousness: a mental 
representation is access conscious in the sense that its content is actually globally 
broadcast, and is thus accessible to the consuming systems connected to the workspace. 
Importantly, the emphasis here is on “actually globally broadcast”, rather than on 
“accessible to the consuming systems”. It is the categorical understanding of access 
consciousness that Carruthers takes Block to adopt in his Overflow Argument. And it is 
the same categorical understanding that Carruthers assumes in his response to Block’s 
argument.5 
Now for Carruthers’s understanding of the relationship between working 
memory and the global workspace. Like Block, Carruthers thinks that the two are 
intimately related. Unlike Block, however, he also thinks that they are not identical. On 
the basis of thesis (4), but also on the basis of his treatment of the issue elsewhere 
(2015), we can understand Carruthers’s view on the matter as the conjunction of two 
claims. First, the contents of working memory are stored in the workspace. This is to 
say that, in effect, working memory is parasitic on the workspace. Second, the contents 
of working memory are normally only a proper subset of the contents of the workspace: 
 
5 Whether access consciousness should be characterized in dispositional or categorical terms is 
an issue that, with few exceptions (see below, for example), has not received the attention 
that it deserves. While discussing the issue is beyond the scope of this paper, the interested 
reader will find a stimulating discussion of it in Stoljar (2019) and in Block’s (2019) reply 
to Stoljar.  
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it is only those contents that are actively sustained (rather than merely broadcast) in the 
workspace that qualify as working memory contents. Note that, as Carruthers explains, 
“the asymmetry envisaged here is diachronic” (2015, p. 84). That is, it is normally the 
case that, over a period of time T, the amount of information that enters the workspace 
is larger than the amount that enters working memory. 
 
Figure 2. From left to right, graphical illustrations of Carruthers’s and Block’s take on the relationship 
between working memory and the global workspace. Carruthers takes working memory to be intimately 
related to, albeit also different from, the global workspace. While the contents of working memory are 
stored in the workspace, they are normally only a proper subset of the contents of the latter. Block, on the 
other hand, takes working memory to be identical to the global workspace. The left figure is redrawn 
from Carruthers (2011, p. 49). 
We are now ready to introduce Carruthers’s response to the Overflow 
Argument. With the above five theses in place, Carruthers notes that the reason why 
Block’s argument fails should be fairly easy to see. The thought is that the amount of 
attention needed to actively sustain the contents of a representation in working memory 
is much larger than the amount required for the same contents to be globally broadcast. 
In the latter case, neural activity will already be strong due to the presence of the 
stimuli. This suggests that less attention will be needed in order to boost that activity 
over the threshold for global broadcasting (2017, p. 68).  The same cannot be said with 
respect to sustaining a representation in working memory, however. For in that case 
attention will have to do its work all by itself. That is, it will have to sustain neural 
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activity beyond the global broadcasting threshold in the absence of bottom-up 
stimulation. As a consequence, claims Carruthers, “greater richness and detail may be 
broadcast in perception than can be sustained in working memory thereafter” (2017, p. 
68).  
In this way, Carruthers can grant that (P1) participants in the Sperling 
experiments are phenomenally conscious of all or most of the presented items in detail; 
explain why (P2) the capacity of working memory is limited to three or four items; and 
vindicate the claim that (C1) more information is phenomenally conscious than is in 
working memory. At the same time, however, he can reject the conclusion of Block’s 
argument, namely, that (C2) the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness is 
independent of the neural basis of access consciousness.  
When participants are presented with an array of letters, they distribute their 
attention “evenly over the entire display” (2017, p. 69). Because exogenously caused 
neural activity is already high, “attention […] may be sufficient to boost the neural 
activity caused by those stimuli over the threshold for global broadcasting.” This, in 
turn, results in phenomenal (and access) consciousness of “most of those items in 
identity-defining detail” (2017, p. 68). At this stage – call it T1 – information about the 
array is broadcast in the workspace, but not yet retained in working memory.  
After stimulus offset – call this stage T2 – exogenously caused neural activity 
will gradually drop. In order to report the letters that they have seen, participants will 
now have to hold the relevant information in working memory. That is, they will now 
have to actively sustain the relevant neural activity, “holding [it] far enough above 
baseline for global broadcasting to continue to take place” (2017, p. 68). Crucially, 
however, in the absence of bottom-up stimulation, attentional resources will not suffice 
to sustain a detailed representation of the array in a broadcast state. Instead, all 
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attentional resources will now have to be focused on a much smaller number of 
characters – three or four – and withdrawn from the others. As a result, three or four is 
the number of letters that participants can normally report. 
On this account, the contrast that Block draws between rich phenomenal 
consciousness and “content-limited” access consciousness is rather a contrast between 
“rich stimulus-driven perception (which is both access-conscious and phenomenally 
conscious) and limited-content working memory (which is likewise both access-
conscious and phenomenally conscious)” (2017, p. 69). As a consequence, concludes 
Carruthers, the step from (C1) to (C2) is unwarranted: the overflow of working memory 
by phenomenal consciousness provides no grounds for arguing that (C2) the neural 
basis of phenomenal consciousness is independent of the neural basis of access 
consciousness. 
4. The Complexity of Neural Responses to Visual Stimuli 
In this section, I present and discuss some important imaging studies relating to neural 
responses to visual stimuli. My aim here is to bring out the complexity of such 
responses, complexity which is due to their dependence on a large variety of factors; 
e.g., factors relating to presentation and attention conditions. Let me start by clarifying 
how this fits into my overall discussion.  
One of the key steps of Carruthers’s argument is “that attention distributed over 
all twelve stimuli may be sufficient to boost the neural activity caused by those stimuli 
over the threshold for global broadcasting”, and that this results in one’s being 
phenomenally (and access) conscious of “most of those items in identity-defining 
detail” (2017, p. 68). In light of a lightly-sketched picture of the impact of attention 
upon neural responses, like the one offered by Carruthers, this seems like an intuitively 
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plausible claim: neural activity caused by the stimuli is already strong, and attentional 
resources distributed over the stimuli may thus be sufficient to trigger the global 
broadcasting of rich information about them. Call claims to the effect that the 
distribution of attention over multiple stimuli results in the global broadcasting of rich 
information about the stimuli C-claims. Is the intuitive plausibility of C-claims a 
guarantee of empirical plausibility? My contention is that it is not.  
Let us assume that all five theses endorsed by Carruthers are true (see §3 above). 
Let us also concede Carruthers that in the Sperling experiments participants distribute 
their attention evenly over the array. Drawing on the imaging studies that I hinted at 
above, in the remainder of this paper I argue that first, the intuitive plausibility of C-
claims is not a guarantee of empirical plausibility; second, that as concerns the same 
claims, strong empirical evidence is needed before confident judgments of empirical 
plausibility can reasonably be formulated. The upshot, I suggest, is that Carruthers’s 
alternative account of overflow does not threaten the Overflow Argument. 
Now for the studies that I have in mind. Using functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI), neuroscientists working on attention have provided evidence to the 
effect that, under certain conditions, the simultaneous presentation of multiple stimuli in 
the absence of attention results in neural activity in one or more visual areas’ being 
weaker, as compared to when one of the stimuli is presented alone and no attention is 
present (e.g., Kastner et al., 1998, 2001; Kastner & Ungerleider, 2000; Scalf & Beck, 
2010). 6 Call the simultaneous presentation of multiple stimuli in the absence of 
 
6 Authors like Kastner et al. (1998) construe this seemingly counterintuitive fact as evidence 
that under certain conditions multiple stimuli compete for representation in visual areas. 
Whether this is right, however, is irrelevant for present purposes. 
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attention unattended-simultaneous, and the presentation of one stimulus in the absence 
of attention unattended-sequential. Just how large the difference in neural activity under 
the two conditions is – and whether there is any difference at all – appears to depend on 
at least the following factors: the visual area whose activity is being measured; the 
complexity, size, and number of the stimuli; the location of the stimuli in the visual 
field; and the distance between the stimuli.  
Suppose, for example, that four complex stimuli are presented in the upper-right 
quadrant of the visual field. Suppose, in addition, that the stimuli are presented within a 
2°x2° display. The difference between neural activity in V2 under unattended-
simultaneous, on the one hand, and unattended-sequential, on the other, will be much 
larger than when two of those stimuli are presented in the same area (Kastner et al., 
2001; S. Kastner, personal communication, July 12-13, 2018). By contrast, if four 
stimuli are presented in a display spanning the upper and lower-right quadrants of the 
visual field, the difference between V2 neural responses under unattended-simultaneous 
and unattended-sequential will be minimal, if not null (Kastner et al., 2001). 
Additional evidence relates to one of the effects that directing attention to a 
single stimulus has on neural activity in the visual areas. Consider the case where 
multiple stimuli are presented simultaneously in the absence of attention, in such a way 
that their presentation results in neural activity in some visual area’s being weaker under 
unattended-simultaneous than under unattended-sequential. Directing attention to only 
one of the stimuli has been found to boost neural responses to the same extent as when 
attention is directed to the same stimulus presented alone (e.g., Kastner et al., 1998). 
Let us now close in on an experiment conducted by Paige Scalf et al. (2011). 
Against the background of the above studies, the authors sought to understand the 
effects of distributed attention on neural responses in visual area V4. Eight participants 
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were presented with five stimuli in five locations in the upper-right quadrant of the 
visual field. Each stimulus was centered in each of five squares arranged in a 
6.14°X6.14° grid (2011, p. 295).7 A total of ninety-six different stimuli were created by 
crossing four shapes (circles, squares, triangles, or hearts) with six colors (blue, yellow, 
green, red, purple, or orange) and four textures (solid, vertical stripes, horizontal stripes, 
and diagonal stripes). Each block of trials involved the same set of stimuli and the 
combination of two presentation conditions, sequential and simultaneous, with two 
attention conditions, attended and unattended. Under sequential presentation each of the 
five stimuli appeared in isolation and in a random order for 250 milliseconds. Under 
simultaneous presentation, instead, the five stimuli were presented together for 250 
milliseconds. Across all trials, participants were to hold fixation on a “rapid serial visual 
presentation (RSVP) stream […] of digits (1-9) and ASCII symbols (%, &, *, #) and a 
single letter (‘a’)” (2011, p. 296). In the unattended-sequential and unattended-
simultaneous conditions, participants were to monitor the stream for the “a”. In the 
attended-sequential and attended-simultaneous conditions, instead, they were to 
“[search] for a color/shape/texture conjunction in any of the five locations” (2011, p. 
295). 
 
7 Information about grid size is due to Diane Beck (personal communication, July 11, 2018). 
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Figure 3. Sequential and simultaneous presentation of the five stimuli. From Scalf et al. (2011). 
Using fMRI, Scalf and colleagues obtained some interesting results. First, in line 
with the results obtained in a previous study (Scalf & Beck, 2010), V4 neural activity 
under unattended-simultaneous was found to be weaker than under unattended-
sequential. Second, consistently with the results reported earlier on, V4 neural activity 
under attended-sequential was observed to be stronger than under unattended-
sequential. As concerns the main aim of the experiments – to explore the effects of 
distributed attention on V4 neural activity – activity under attended-simultaneous was 
found to be stronger than under unattended-simultaneous. Crucially, however, activity 
under attended-simultaneous was also found to be weaker than under attended-
sequential. In other words, although distributing attention over multiple stimuli was 
found to boost V4 neural activity, it never boosted it as much as did directing attention 
to one stimulus. 
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Figure 4. From left to right, V4 neural activity under unattended-sequential, unattended-simultaneous, 
attended-sequential, and attended-simultaneous. From Scalf et al. (2011). 
The studies discussed thus far lend support to the third of Carruthers’s theses 
above; namely, that (3) “the effect of attentional signals is to boost the neural activity 
underlying the targeted representations” (2017, p. 68). At the same time, they also bring 
out the complexity of neural responses to visual stimuli – especially to multiple 
simultaneously presented ones – as a direct consequence of their dependence on a large 
variety of factors. But how is this relevant for my challenge to Carruthers’s response to 
the Overflow Argument? The idea is that this complexity has some important 
implications for attempts to determine the empirical plausibility of C-claims. To reveal 
these implications, in the next section, I start by arguing that in the Scalf et al. 
experiment the global broadcasting of V4 information under attended-simultaneous 
does not always occur.  
5. The Complex Affair of Global Broadcasting 
It should be uncontroversial that in the Scalf et al. experiment the global broadcasting of 
rich V4 information occurs under attended-sequential across all (or most) trials: 
attention is directed to a single stimulus that is presented for a rather long time – 250 
milliseconds – and this results in the global broadcasting of information about the 
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stimulus. But does the global broadcasting of rich V4 information also occur under 
attended-simultaneous? More precisely, does the distribution of attention over five 
stimuli under attended-simultaneous result in the global broadcasting of rich V4 
information about them? In light of Carruthers’s broad picture of the effects of attention 
upon neural responses, it would be tempting to say yes. Neural activity caused by the 
stimuli is already strong, and attention may thus be sufficient to boost that activity 
beyond the threshold for global broadcasting. In light of the empirical findings 
discussed in §4, however, things may be more problematic than they seem.  
One of the main issues here is that V4 neural activity under unattended-
simultaneous is much weaker than under unattended-sequential. This suggests that 
significantly more attentional resources will be needed to boost V4 activity caused by 
multiple stimuli over the broadcasting threshold than activity caused by a single 
stimulus. Another potential issue arises if we consider that attention is a limited 
resource. In light of this, the amount of attention allocated to each of the five stimuli 
will presumably be much smaller than the amount allocated to a single stimulus. On the 
basis of these two points, we can formulate the following hypothesis: in at least some (if 
not, as we will see, in several) trials, the global broadcasting of V4 information about 
multiple simultaneously presented stimuli does not occur.8  
 
8 Why not all trials? For although Scalf et al. speak as if V4 neural responses under unattended-
simultaneous were always much weaker than under unattended-sequential, what their 
study actually shows is that V4 neural responses under the former condition tend to be, in 
a statistically significant way, much weaker than under the latter condition. This suggests 
that we need to remain open to the possibility that the difference in activity between the 
two conditions may sometimes be smaller than what is represented in figure 4.  
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The hypothesis under scrutiny is strongly supported by the results of an 
additional experiment that Scalf et al. conducted in order to determine the behavioral 
consequences of their previous findings (2011, pp. 300–301). Based on the results of 
their V4 imaging studies, the authors predicted that behavioral performance in certain 
tasks would be significantly worse under attended-simultaneous than under attended-
sequential. To test their hypothesis, the authors presented participants with arrays of 
stimuli whose spatial layout and components were identical to those described earlier 
on. Unlike before, however, each block of trials involved the combination of sequential 
and simultaneous presentation conditions with the attended condition alone. Prior to 
each trial, participants were presented with a specific conjunction of 
color/shape/texture. The task was “to respond as quickly as possible [by pressing a 
button] if the conjunction appeared at any point in the display [and a different button] if 
they did not see the target at any point in the trial” (2011, p. 300). As predicted on the 
basis of the results of their imaging studies, Scalf and colleagues found that 
performance under attended-simultaneous was significantly worse than under attended-
sequential. In other words, they found that under attended-simultaneous, participants 
failed to detect the presence or absence of the color/shape/texture conjunction in a 
significantly larger number of instances than under attended-sequential. 
What explains this difference in performance? A natural suggestion is that V4 
information about the stimuli under attended-simultaneous is not globally broadcast 
across several trials and is thus not available for participants to guide their responses in 
the same trials. It is well known that V4 plays a crucial in the representation of color, 
shapes, and boundaries (Gazzaniga et al., 2014, p. 203). Accordingly, if no V4 
information about a stimulus is globally broadcast, no information about any of those 
features will be made available to mechanisms of reporting, reasoning, deciding, and so 
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on. In this sense, the results obtained by the authors lend further support to our 
hypothesis: across several trials, the global broadcasting of V4 information under 
attended-simultaneous does not occur.  
For my purposes, the empirical plausibility of this hypothesis is important in two 
ways. To begin with, it clearly shows that as concerns C-claims, intuitively plausibility 
is not a guarantee of empirical plausibility. As noted earlier on, in light of the lightly-
sketched picture of the impact of attention on neural responses offered by Carruthers, it 
would be quite tempting to argue as follows: when participants in the Scalf et al. 
experiments distribute their attention over five stimuli, rich V4 information about those 
stimuli is broadcast in the global workspace across all (or most) trials. But now we have 
good reason to believe that this is not the case. Better, we have good reason to believe 
that across several trials, the global broadcasting of V4 information about the stimuli 
does not occur. 
The same hypothesis can also serve as a platform to advance a second claim that 
is intimately related to the one above; namely, that as concerns C-claims, confident 
judgements of empirical plausibility can only be made in the presence of strong 
empirical evidence. For suppose that some of the factors the strength of neural 
responses depends upon were altered. Suppose, for example, that the grid used in the 
Scalf et al. experiments were positioned in a different area of the visual field. What 
effects would this have on V4 neural responses under attended-simultaneous? In one 
experiment, Kastner et al. (2001) presented a 6°x6° array of four stimuli in the upper-
right quadrant of the visual field. Then they presented the same display but in such a 
way that this spanned two quadrants of a hemifield. While in the former case V3A 
responses were observed to be significantly stronger under unattended-sequential than 
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under unattended-simultaneous, in the latter case the difference in neural strength 
between the two conditions was negligible (Kastner et al., 2001, p. 1405).  
The upshot here I believe is this. Even though, as I have argued, there are 
several trials of the Scalf et al. experiments where the global broadcasting of V4 
information does not occur, it is unlikely that the same considerations would hold if the 
location of the grid or, say, the distance between the stimuli in the experiments were 
altered. In the case in point, depending on the location of the grid, there may be series of 
trials where the global broadcasting of V4 information always occurs, but also series of 
trials where it never does. What this suggests, in turn, is that assessing the empirical 
plausibility of C-claims requires careful attention to the delicate and (in some ways 
surprising) subtle empirical evidence that bears upon the issue – evidence of the sort 
provided in support of my hypothesis about global broadcasting in the Scalf et al. 
experiments, for example. 
One worry may be my argument relies too heavily on the solidity of that 
hypothesis. My main reason for focusing on the question whether the global 
broadcasting of V4 information occurred under attended-simultaneous in the Scalf et al. 
experiments was twofold: to give one a sense of the intricate relationship between 
neural responses, global broadcasting, and behavioral responses, but also a sense of the 
sort of empirical evidence that I believe is needed to assess the empirical plausibility of 
C-claims. Having said that, I believe that we can establish the two main points of my 
discussion in the absence of that hypothesis. Let me explain. The imaging studies 
discussed in §4 suggest that the strength of neural responses to multiple stimuli depends 
on a multiplicity of factors; e.g., the complexity and location of the stimuli, the distance 
between the stimuli, and so on. Most of these things, in turn, vary from one visual scene 
to another. But in virtue of the intimate relationship between neural responses and 
24 
 
global broadcasting, it seems clear that whether and which sort of information (e.g., 
information processed by V2, V4, or all mid-level areas) about the stimuli is globally 
broadcast strongly depends on the specific features of each visual scene. This suggests 
two things.  
First, as before, the intuitive plausibility of C-claims is not a guarantee of 
empirical plausibility. As noted on more than one occasion, on the basis of Carruthers’s 
broad picture of the effects of attention on neural responses, it may be tempting to argue 
that when attention is evenly distributed over multiple stimuli, attentional resources may 
be sufficient to trigger the global broadcasting of rich information about them. But in 
light of the fact that the occurrence and extent of global broadcasting are strongly 
dependent on the specific features of a visual scene, the intuitive plausibility of claims 
of this sort is no guarantee of empirical plausibility. Second, and for exactly the same 
reason, making sensible assessments of the empirical plausibility of these claims 
requires strong empirical evidence.  
I take it to have convincingly argued that the complexity of neural responses to 
multiple stimuli has some strong implications for attempts to determine the empirical 
plausibility of C-claims. The question to address now is how this is relevant for 
Carruthers’s response to Block’s Overflow Argument. This is what I intend to do below.   
6. Back to Overflow 
In his attempt to offer a “better” (2017, p. 65) and “empirically plausible [emphasis 
added]” (2017, p. 67) explanation of the overflow of phenomenal consciousness by 
working memory, Carruthers argues that when participants in the Sperling experiments 
are presented with an array of letters, “attention is distributed evenly over the entire 
display” (2017, p. 69) – the truth of this claim, I have conceded at the beginning of §4. 
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Furthermore, he also claims that “attention distributed over all twelve stimuli may be 
sufficient to boost neural activity caused by those stimuli over the threshold for global 
broadcasting” (2017, p. 68), and that this results in one’s being phenomenally – and 
access – conscious of “most of those items in identity-defining detail” (2017, p. 68). 
In light of my extensive discussion about neural responses to visual stimuli and 
global broadcasting, it should now be clear why Carruthers’s alternative account of 
overflow is not a real threat to Block’s. That the distribution of attention over the 
Sperling array may be sufficient to trigger the global broadcasting of rich information 
about it is, as noted, an intuitively plausible idea: neural activity caused by the stimuli is 
already strong, and attentional resources distributed over the stimuli may thus be 
sufficient to boost it over the global broadcasting threshold. Because of the 
experimentally-uncovered complexity of neural responses to multiple visual stimuli, 
however, the empirical plausibility of this claim is not at all obvious. For all we know, it 
is entirely possible that distributing one’s attention over the Sperling array may never 
boost neural responses in any of the mid-level sensory areas over the threshold for 
global broadcasting. Or perhaps it will boost neural responses beyond the global 
broadcasting threshold in some instances but not others. Or yet maybe it will boost 
neural responses over that threshold in V2 and V3, but not in V4.  
The moral of the story, I believe, is this: the empirical plausibility of 
Carruthers’s claim about global broadcasting in the Sperling experiments cannot be 
established on the basis of its mere intuitive plausibility. Rather, the rich experimental 
detail that has been uncovered in relation to attention and visual neurology shows that 
here – and in many other cases too, we might suspect – strong empirical evidence is 
needed before confident judgements of empirical plausibility can reasonably be 
formulated. As Carruthers provides no such evidence for his claim, his account of the 
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overflow of working memory by phenomenal consciousness does not threaten the 
Overflow Argument. 
It is worth stressing that my observations have consequences that extend beyond 
Carruthers’s own argument. In their own attempt to question the soundness of Block’s 
Overflow Argument, for example, Naccache and Dehaene argue as follows: 
When subjects [in the Sperling experiments] report seeing “all the letters,” we 
suggest that they distribute their attention globally over the array, and thus are only 
able to determine its approximate numerosity and “letterhood”; our model predicts 
that only this approximate content, not the detailed letter identities, accesses a fronto-
parietal global neuronal workspace (Naccache & Dehaene, 2007, p. 519). 
Naccache and Dehaene’s argumentative strategy is different from Carruthers’s. Unlike 
the latter, the authors contend that the participants’ belief to have seen all or most of the 
letters in great detail should not be taken at face value. Rather, they suggest that when 
participants distribute their attention over the array, the only information that is globally 
broadcast is information about the array’s “approximate numerosity and ‘letterhood’”. 
But although Naccache and Dehaene say that this is what the Global Workspace Model 
predicts, no evidence of any form is offered in support of their claim. Thus, for exactly 
the same reasons why we should be skeptical of Carruthers’s own suggestion, the value 
of Naccache and Dehaene’s claim is easily put into question: in the absence of strong 
empirical evidence, there are no grounds here to believe that the distribution of attention 
over the Sperling array results in the global broadcasting of  
information about the array’s “approximate numerosity and ‘letterhood’”. 
8. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, I have argued that Carruthers’s alternative account of overflow does not 
threaten Block’s Overflow Argument. The overall plausibility of Carruthers’s account 
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rests on the empirical plausibility of a claim that has some intuitive plausibility, but for 
which he does not provide sufficient empirical support. Drawing on a number of 
imaging studies to reveal the complexity of neural responses to visual stimuli, I have 
argued for two intimately related claims: first, that the intuitive plausibility of claims 
like Carruthers’s – what I have called C-claims – is not a guarantee of empirical 
plausibility; second, that as concerns the same claims, confident judgements of 
empirical plausibility can only be made in the presence of strong empirical evidence.  
Of course, my discussion will raise a number of questions that I am unable to 
address herein. For example, suppose we found evidence to the effect that the 
distribution of attention over the Sperling array triggered the global broadcasting of a 
detailed representation of four or five characters, thereby refuting Carruthers’s 
alternative account of overflow. This would leave us with the question whether detailed 
information about most characters was phenomenally conscious in the absence of global 
broadcasting.9 Consider also the issue of the relationship between working memory and 
the global workspace. While Block assumes that the two are identical, Carruthers thinks 
that they are intimately related but not identical. Which view, if any, is on the right 
track? This question is hugely important, not just in relation to the Overflow Argument, 
but also as concerns our understanding of the notion of access consciousness more 
generally.  
Both issue notwithstanding, two things seem clear enough: First, the question 
whether the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness is independent of the neural 
basis of access consciousness remains far from settled. Second, and more broadly, any 
future attempt to establish the empirical plausibility of C-claims – but also of claims 
 
9 I am thankful to an anonymous reviewer of this paper for bringing this issue to my attention. 
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along the lines of Naccache and Dehaene’s – will need to attend carefully to the delicate 
and subtle empirical evidence that bears heavily upon the issue.10  
References 
Baars, B. J. (1988). A cognitive theory of consciousness. Cambridge University Press. 
Baddeley, A. D. (2007). Working memory, thought, and action. Oxford University 
Press. 
Block, N. (1995). On a confusion about a function of consciousness. Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences, 18(2), 227–247. 
Block, N. (2007a). Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and 
neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30(5–6), 481–499. 
Block, N. (2007b). Overflow, Access, and Attention. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 
30(5–6), 530–548. 
Block, N. (2019). Poise, Dispositions, and Access Consciousness: Reply to Stoljar. In 
A. Pautz & D. Stoljar (Eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of 
Mind and Consciousness (pp. 537–544). The MIT Press. 
Carruthers, P. (2011). The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge. 
Oxford University Press. 
Carruthers, P. (2015). Centered Mind: What the Science of Working Memory Shows Us 
About the Nature of Human Thought. Oxford University Press. 
Carruthers, P. (2017). Block’s Overflow Argument. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 
98(S1), 65–70. 
 
10 In addition to three anonymous referees for Philosophical Psychology, I would like to express 
my gratitude to Dominic Gregory and Luca Barlassina for invaluable comments on 
previous drafts of this paper. 
29 
 
Cohen, M. A., & Dennett, D. C. (2011). Consciousness cannot be separated from 
function. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15(8), 358–364. 
Cowan, N. (2001). The magical number 4 in short-term memory: A reconsideration of 
mental storage capacity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24(1), 87–114. 
Cowan, N. (2005). Working Memory Capacity Limits in a Theoretical Context. In C. 
Izawa & N. Ohta (Eds.), Human Learning and Memory: Advances in Theory 
and Applications (pp. 155–175). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Dehaene, S., & Changeux, J.-P. (2004). Neural Mechanisms for Access to 
Consciousness. In M. S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences (pp. 
1145–1157). The MIT Press. 
Dehaene, S., Changeux, J.-P., & Naccache, L. (2011). The Global Neuronal Workspace 
Model of Conscious Access: From Neuronal Architectures to Clinical 
Applications. In S. Dehaene & Y. Christen (Eds.), Characterizing 
Consciousness: From Cognition to the Clinic? (pp. 55–84). Springer. 
Dehaene, S., Changeux, J.-P., Naccache, L., Sackur, J., & Sergent, C. (2006). 
Conscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing: A testable taxonomy. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(5), 204–211. 
Dehaene, S., & Naccache, L. (2001). Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of 
Consciousness: Basic Evidence and a Workspace Framework. Cognition, 79(1), 
1–37. 
Gazzaniga, M. S., Ivry, R. B., & Mangun, G. R. (2014). Cognitive Neuroscience: The 
Biology of the Mind. W. W. Norton & Company. 
Kastner, S., De Weerd, P., Desimone, R., & Ungerleider, L. G. (1998). Mechanisms of 
Directed Attention in the Human Extrastriate Cortex as Revealed by Functional 
MRI. Science, 282(5386), 108 LP – 111. 
30 
 
Kastner, S., De Weerd, P., Pinsk, M. A., Elizondo, M. I., Desimone, R., & Ungerleider, 
L. G. (2001). Modulation of Sensory Suppression: Implications for Receptive 
Field Sizes in the Human Visual Cortex. Journal of Neurophysiology, 86(3), 
1398–1411. 
Kastner, S., & Ungerleider, L. G. (2000). Mechanisms of Visual Attention in the 
Human Cortex. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 23, 315–341. 
Lamme, V. A. F. (2004). Separate neural definitions of visual consciousness and visual 
attention: A case for phenomenal awareness. Neural Networks, 17(5–6), 861–
872. 
Lamme, V. A. F., & Roelfsema, P. R. (2000). The distinct modes of vision offered by 
feedforward and recurrent processing. Trends in Neurosciences, 23(11), 571–
579. 
Luck, S. J., & Vogel, E. K. (1997). The capacity of visual working memory for features 
and conjunctions. Nature, 390(6657), 279–281. 
Naccache, L., & Dehaene, S. (2007). Reportability and illusions of phenomenality in the 
light of the global neuronal workspace model. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 
30(5–6), 518–520. 
Phillips, I. (2011). Perception and Iconic Memory: What Sperling Doesn’t Show. Mind 
& Language, 26(4), 381–411. 
Prinz, J. (2012). The Conscious Brain. Oxford University Press. 
Scalf, P. E., Basak, C., & Beck, D. M. (2011). Attention Does More than Modulate 
Suppressive Interactions: Attending To Multiple Items. Experimental Brain 
Research, 212(2), 293–304. 
Scalf, P. E., & Beck, D. M. (2010). Competition in Visual Cortex Impedes Attention to 
Multiple Items. The Journal of Neuroscience, 30(1), 161–169. 
31 
 
Sperling, G. (1960). The Information Available in Brief Visual Presentations. 
Psychological Monographs, 74(11), 1–29. 
Stazicker, J. (2011). Attention, Visual Consciousness and Indeterminacy. Mind & 
Language, 26(2), 156–184. 
Stoljar, D. (2019). In Praise of Poise. In A. Pautz & D. Stoljar (Eds.), Blockheads! 
Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness (pp. 511–535). 
The MIT Press. 
Wu, W. (2018). The Neuroscience of Consciousness. The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/consciousness-
neuroscience/ 
 
 
